Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions by Mikha

Description: Designing Federalism by Mikhail Filippov, Olga Shvetsova, Peter C. Ordeshook Argues that a number of institutional variables can be critical in determining federal success. FORMAT Hardcover LANGUAGE English CONDITION Brand New Publisher Description Because of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are naturally committed to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements. Table of Contents 1. Federations and the theoretical problem: 1.1 Why Federalism; 1.2 Definitions; 1.3 The long search for stability; Federalism as nuisance; Federalism as engine of prosperity; Riker as intermediary; 1.4 The fundamental problem of stability; 1.5 Basic premises and conclusions; 2. Federal bargaining: 2.1 Alliances versus federations; 2.2 The private character of public goods; 2.3 Equilibrium selection and redistribution; 2.4 The federal problem; 2.5 Bargaining for control of the center; 2.6 Allocating jurisdictions; 2.7 Three levels of institutional design; 3. Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining: 3.1 The Czechoslovak dissolution; 3.2 The Soviet dissolution; 3.3 The feasibility of success in initial bargaining; 3.4 Secession: the special road to renegotiation; 4. Representation: 4.1 Two alternative models of Federalism; 4.2 A national venue for bargaining; 4.3 Within versus without; 4.4 Direct versus delegated representation; 4.5 Other parameters of design; 4.6 Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia; 5. Incentives: 5.1 Institutional enforcement; 5.2 The court; 5.3 Some simple rules of constitutional design; 5.4 Voters versus elites; 5.5 Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle; 6. Political parties in a federal state: 6.1 An extreme hypothesis; 6.2 Parties in a democracy; 6.3 The idealized party system; 6.4 Integrated parties; 6.5 Integration outside the United States; Australian Federalism and the role of parties; Canada; 6.6 India; Leadership incentives; Rank and file incentives; The party and Federalism; 1967 and thereafter; 7. Institutional sources of federal stability I: 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Level 2 and the federalist; 7.3 Level 3 institutions; 7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited; Germany; Canada; Canada vs Australia and India; 7.3 Local and regional design parameters; 8. Institutional sources of federal stability II: 8.1 Electoral mechanisms and societal structures; Representation; Ethnicity; Defining federal subjects; Number of local jurisdictions; Authority over local governments; 8.2 Bicameralism; Symmetry; Presidential authority; Presidential selection; Electoral connections; 8.3 Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate; 8.4 Level 0 - things beyond design; 9. Designing Federalism: 9.1 Russia; Electoral arrangements; Regional autonomy; Constitutional matters; Parties and the current status quo; 9.2 The European Union; Background; The role of parties; The puzzle of the collusion; France versus Britain; EU institutional design; 9.4 Conclusion. Promotional This book argues that a number of institutional variables can be critical in determining federal success. Promotional "Headline" This book argues that a number of institutional variables can be critical in determining federal success. Description for Bookstore The authors argue that rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, a number of institutional variables not normally associated with federal design (the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment) can be critical to determining federal success. Description for Library The authors argue that rather than any carefully delineated allocation of policy jurisdictions, a number of institutional variables not normally associated with federal design (the content of regional charters and the extent to which public offices are filled by election rather than appointment) can be critical to determining federal success. Details ISBN0521816181 Author Peter C. Ordeshook Short Title DESIGNING FEDERALISM Pages 396 Publisher Cambridge University Press Language English ISBN-10 0521816181 ISBN-13 9780521816182 Media Book Format Hardcover DEWEY 321.02 Year 2004 Imprint Cambridge University Press Subtitle A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions Place of Publication Cambridge Country of Publication United Kingdom Birth 1942 DOI 10.1604/9780521816182 UK Release Date 2004-01-12 AU Release Date 2004-01-12 NZ Release Date 2004-01-12 Publication Date 2004-01-12 Alternative 9780511610875 Illustrations 17 Tables, unspecified; 10 Line drawings, unspecified Audience Professional & Vocational We've got this At The Nile, if you're looking for it, we've got it. With fast shipping, low prices, friendly service and well over a million items - you're bound to find what you want, at a price you'll love! TheNile_Item_ID:7783075;

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